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Summary: Although both the Lithuanian authorities and Lithuanian 
courts had already started to apply EC law well before accession, 
the quality of application of EC law and the frequency of its use have 
only improved within the last two years. Nevertheless, there is still 
room and need for improvement in this area before proper applica-
tion of EC law in all sectors is achieved. This article analyses some 
cases decided by the Lithuanian authorities and the highest Lithu-
anian courts for both administrative and general jurisdiction, mainly 
in the fi elds of competition law and intellectual property law. Sum-
marising the application of EC law by the Lithuanian Supreme Court 
in the area of civil jurisdiction, particularly intellectual property rights, 
on the one hand, and the Lithuanian Supreme Administrative Court 
and the Lithuanian Competition Council, with a special focus on com-
petition law, on the other, the authors contend that the application 
of EC law in the areas under consideration is far from ideal. In most 
cases, courts have not yet developed a general view of Community 
law as a sui generis system of law. There are still diffi culties in dis-
tinguishing between EC law and ordinary international law. Instead 
of referring to the specifi c nature of EC law, which is accepted in both 
constitutional jurisprudence and national legislation, courts treat EC 
law as something analogous to international law. The principles set 
forth by the ECJ concerning the ‘ideal’ application of Community law 
by the national judiciary have apparently not yet been fully compre-
hended by Lithuania’s courts. While they seem to have learned that 
supremacy must be given to EC law, in most cases they are unable 
to consistently incorporate reasoning based on such supremacy into 
their judgments. However, when these two ‘pioneer’ fi elds of EC law 
application are analysed, it is obvious that changes are gradually oc-
curring. The fi rst examples of application by both supreme courts were 
very poor ones, lacking a systematic approach to application and in-
suffi cient in both quality and quantity. The development of case law 
in trademark disputes permits a more positive evaluation, while in the 
area of competition law EC law has begun to be applied much more 
purposefully. ECJ case law is being referred to, and arguments by the 
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parties based on EC law are given due consideration. Still, these two 
areas represent the most well-developed ones, while similar progress 
has not yet been seen in other fi elds of EC law. Hopefully, satisfactory 
practice in the fi elds considered here will spill over into a more general 
awareness of EC law and, accordingly, its proper application. Since 
‘the will’ to apply EC law seems to exist on the part of national courts 
and institutions, ‘the way’ to apply it correctly must also be found. For 
the moment, the way is time, training and practice.
Introduction
Ten new Member States (no longer the newest) are already celebrat-
ing the third anniversary of their accession to the European Union. Upon 
accession, these new members not only had to remodel their legal systems 
by implementing the acquis communautaire, but were now also obliged to 
apply EC law in practice. Taking into account both the volume of EC law 
relevant to everyday legal practice and the specifi c conditions for its ap-
plication, this task has proved to be much more complicated than the 
copy-paste technique of ‘implementing’ the acquis.
Lithuania has consistently been among those Member States with 
the best record of formal integration of EC law into its national law,1 and 
to date no infringement procedure against it has reached the judicial 
stage.2 When analysing the decisions of Lithuanian courts, however, one 
realises that proper enforcement of EC law still requires much effort. Na-
tional courts need to further deepen their knowledge of the functioning of 
EC law, become more familiar with the relevant case law, understand the 
complex relationships between national and European law, and eliminate 
tensions that could occur when enforcing European provisions in the 
domestic legal system.3 It is obviously not enough for courts to merely 
know the relevant European legislation; rather, they must also fi nd the 
right approach to its application, make use of the available national and 
1  See eg the Commission’s Internal Market Scoreboards nos 14, 14 bis, 15, 15 bis <http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/score/index_en.htm> accessed 15 April 2007.
2  On 22 March 2007 the Commission announced that it was bringing an action against 
Lithuania in a new round of proceedings for infringement of EU telecom rules, namely defi -
ciencies with the emergency number 112 (Commission Press Release IP/07/392, 22 March 
2007). However, as of 25 May 2007 no notice regarding this action had been published in 
the OJ.
3  See also Egidijus Kūris, ‘Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucija ir Europos teisès iššūkiai’ 
[‘The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and the challenges of European law’] (2004) 
Justitia 37; for an evaluation of factors infl uencing the work of the Supreme Administra-
tive Court of Lithuania, see Virgilijus ValanËius, ‘Lietuvos administraciniai teismai: pirmieji 
įspūdžiai taikant ES teisę’ [‘Lithuanian Administrative Courts: First impression applying EC 
law’] (2004) Justitia 25-32.
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European legal resources with an awareness of their own legal situation 
and the competence to apply it, and be fl exible enough to fi nd the most 
appropriate way of achieving effective application and enforcement.4
This article aims to examine and evaluate the application of EC law 
by Lithuania’s two highest courts - the Supreme Court5 and the Supreme 
Administrative Court6 - before and since accession, covering the period 
from January 2000 to April 2007. 
The Legal Basis For Applying European Union Law In Lithuania: 
A General Overview
Before accession to the European Union, there were no formal 
grounds in Lithuanian law for applying EC law (with the exception of the 
Europe Agreement7 and competition law8). Lithuania’s Constitution only 
contained a provision concerning international treaties,9 which was more 
specifi cally defi ned by the Law on Treaties10 and interpreted by the Con-
stitutional Court11 as grounds for applying international law. In prepar-
ing for EU accession, the Law on Courts, the Law on Administrative Liti-
gation, the Civil Procedure Code and the Criminal Procedure Code were 
amended in 2003. These amendments, which were to enter into force on 
4  Phedon Nicolaides, ‘Preparing for Accession to the European Union: How to Establish 
Capacity for Effective and Credible Application of EU Rules’ in Marise Cremona (ed), The 
Enlargement of the European Union (Academy of European Law, European University Insti-
tute, Oxford 2003) 56-60.
5  Hereinafter also LSC.
6  Hereinafter also LSAC.
7  The Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities 
and their Member States, for the one part, and the Republic of Lithuania, for the other part 
([1998] OJ L51/3) entered into force on 1 February 1998, and was directly applicable, at 
least in theory, since Lithuania has a monistic system with regard to the effect of interna-
tional treaties.
8  As early as in 1999, Art 1(3) of Lithuania’s Competition Law explicitly stated one of its 
purposes as seeking to harmonise Lithuania’s competition policy with European Union law 
(Offi cial Gazette 1999, no 30-856). On this basis, the Lithuanian Competition Council has 
taken decisions by European courts and the Commission and their interpretation into ac-
count when applying the Competition Law.
9  Art 138 para 3 of the Lithuanian Constitution reads: ‘International treaties ratifi ed by the 
Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania shall be a constituent part of the legal system of the 
Republic of Lithuania’ (Offi cial Gazette 1992, no 33-1014; offi cial English translation avail-
able at <http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=275302> accessed 30 
March 2007).
10  Offi cial Gazette 1999, no 60-1948.
11  The Constitutional Court’s opinion of 24 January 1995 on accession to the EHRC (Offi -
cial Gazette 1995, no 9-199). Although in this earliest ruling the Constitutional Court inter-
preted Art 138 para 3 of the Constitution as taking a monist approach only to international 
treaties ratifi ed by the Seimas, later the general conclusion was drawn that Lithuania takes 
a monist approach to all international law (see Decision of the Constitutional Court of 14 
March 2006, no 17/02-24/02-06/03-22/04).
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the day of accession to the EU, provided the basis for national courts to 
apply EC law in cases brought before them.12 The amended national laws 
and legal codes thus stated that a court hearing a case should also apply 
EC law and be guided by the decisions of European institutions and the 
preliminary rulings of the ECJ. Moreover, these amendments introduced 
a clause ‘allowing’ national courts to refer a preliminary question to the 
ECJ, in cases where its ruling is needed by a national court hearing a 
case that involves some unclear point of EC law.13 These amendments 
introduced some precision regarding the basis in national law for the ap-
plication of EC law.14 However, such special provisions enabling national 
courts to make reference to ECJ rulings were no longer necessary follow-
ing EU accession, since the obligation to apply EC law, and especially 
the obligation to refer questions to the ECJ, derives from EC law itself, 
irrespective of whether any ground for it exists in national law. 
Shortly after accession, the Constitutional Act on Membership of the 
Lithuanian Republic in the EU, supplementing the Lithuanian Constitu-
tion, was also adopted; among other things, it provides that EC law is a 
constituent part of Lithuania’s legal system.15 Moreover, the Constitu-
tional Act provides that EC law must be applied directly if such applica-
tion follows from the Founding Treaties, and grants EC law supremacy 
over national law in the event of a confl ict.16 By adopting the Constitu-
12  Law of 8 April 2003 amending the Law on Courts, the Law on Administrative Litigation, 
the Civil Procedure Code and the Criminal Procedure Code (Offi cial Gazette 2003, no 39-
1765).
13  There is, however, another interesting provision in this amendment relating to the duty 
of the LSC and the LSAC to ensure uniform application of European Community law by 
lower courts. According to this provision, the LSC and the LSAC are entitled to examine the 
practice of lower courts in applying EC law and make recommendations on how uniform 
interpretation and application of this law in Lithuania is to be ensured (Art 1 and Art 3 of 
Chapter I, Art 1 of Chapter 2, and Art 1 of Chapter 3 of the aforementioned law (n 12)). This 
quasi-administrative function of ‘recommendation’ by the highest courts is a relict of the 
Soviet legal system, where the highest court performed not only judicial functions, but also 
administrative ones, ie supervising lower courts. Although modifi ed, this function remains 
in the Lithuanian court system today. The LSC and the LSAC are authorised to summarise 
the practice of lower courts, which in practice means that they choose a certain area of law, 
examine the judgments of lower courts, and publish formally non-binding reviews, resolu-
tions and consultations on certain aspects of application of the law. 
14  This provision, stipulating the obligation to apply EC law, has been used by the courts 
(eg the LSC’s Decision of 29 December 2006, no 3K-3-690/2006) rather than the ECJ’s 
case law on this obligation (for more details, see n 40 below).
15  Constitutional Act on Membership of the Lithuanian Republic in the EU (Offi cial Gazette 
2004, no 111-4123). 
16  For a more detailed discussion, see Vilenas Vadapalas, Irmantas Jarukaitis: ‘Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Lithuania, International Law and Accession to the European Union’ 
in Francisco F Segado (ed) The Spanish Constitution in the European Constitutional Context 
(Madrid 2003) 473-488; Irmantas Jarukaitis, ‘New Member States: Lithuania’ in Alfred E 
Kellerman (ed), The Impact of EU Accession on the Legal Orders of New EU Member States 
and (Pre-)Candidate Countries (The Hague, 2006) 385-407.
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tional Act, which forms an integral part of the Constitution, the Lithua-
nian Parliament confi rmed again (as in the aforementioned amendments 
to the procedural codes, which set forth the obligation to apply EC law) 
its conviction that the basis for applying EC law derives from the Consti-
tution itself. Although the Constitutional Act formalised the application 
of EC law and its supremacy, in line with how these principles have been 
developed by the ECJ, it also rejected the idea that the application of EC 
law proceeds from EC law itself.17 
As discussed below, however, ‘ordinary’ national courts have paid 
little attention to the question of whence the obligation to apply EC law 
originates. There has not yet been a single case in which a court referred 
to the Constitutional Act18 or relied on its provisions establishing the 
constitutional background for applying EC law. Moreover, it seems that 
the amendments and clauses concerning the application of EC law in-
troduced into the national procedural codes and the Constitutional Act 
have not infl uenced the reasoning of national courts. Rather, these courts 
have applied EC law based on the very fact (once future, now actual) of 
EU accession.
EC Law in the Case Law of the Lithuanian Supreme Court
Being the older and thus more ‘genuine’ of Lithuania’s two highest 
courts, the Lithuanian Supreme Court (LSC) has not been keen to give up 
its leading jurisdictional role to its counterpart, the Lithuanian Supreme 
Administrative Court (LSAC). Since the LSC had begun applying Europe-
an Community law in its rulings well before accession, and had done so 
quite willingly, it could be considered a court with highly pro-European 
convictions. As the saying goes, however, ‘the road to hell is paved with 
good intentions’; and even the enthusiasm and goodwill to do something 
does not always (or, as in the case of the LSC’s application of Community 
law, not immediately) lead to good results. Despite its pro-European ac-
tivism, quite a few of the LSC’s early attempts to deal with EC law (both 
before and after accession) were inconsistent, unsystematic and, in many 
instances, even quite inaccurate. 
17  I Jarukaitis, ‘The Adoption of the Third Constitutional Act and Its Impact on the National 
Constitutional System’ (2006) 60 Teise: mokslo darbai 29.
18  Except for the Constitutional Court itself, which has found an opportunity to interpret 
the Constitutional Act and given its position on the impact of EC law in the national legal 
system twice already (Decision of 14 March 2006 on the use of certain land, no 17/02-
24/02-06/03-22/04, and Decision of 21 December 2006 on the fi nancing of national radio 
and television, no 30/03).
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Before Accession
The very fi rst case in which the LSC referred to something like Euro-
pean Community law (Sirowa) was already decided in 1998.19, 20 The ap-
plicant sought to have a decision imposing a fi ne for the misleading label-
ling of a medicinal product annulled (administrative courts had not yet 
been established at that time, and so courts of general jurisdiction also 
reviewed the legality of administrative decisions). Analysing the defi ni-
tion of medicinal products, the LSC briefl y noted that both the defi nition 
of a medicinal product and the labelling requirements for such products 
under national legislation corresponded in principle with the relevant 
Community directives.21 Nothing more was said about EC law and, in 
particular, no explanation was given as to why it was of any importance 
that defi nitions under national law be the same as European ones. In 
the second case (Birštono mineraliniai vandenys, decided in 2000),22 the 
Supreme Court likewise merely cited the defi nitions of designation of ori-
gin and geographical indication given in the GI Regulation,23 without any 
explanation of why it was referring to EC law and on what grounds. The 
Court did not elaborate any arguments relating to Community law; rath-
er, it used these defi nitions merely as a comparative and interpretative 
source of law, since the national law on trademarks in force at the time 
did not contain such defi nitions. The LSC stated that although national 
law did not contain defi nitions of designation of origin and geographical 
indication, some ‘international documents’ (meaning the EC Regulation) 
defi ned these concepts. Apart from giving a fi rst signal that the LSC re-
garded EC law as ordinary international public law, nothing signifi cant 
for the ‘application’ of EC law by Lithuanian courts was said in this case, 
either. Obviously, these two examples could hardly be termed an ‘ap-
plication’ of Community law. The LSC simply cited EC law provisions 
that were either analogous to the parallel national provision or (as in the 
geographical indications case) suitable for fi lling a gap in the national leg-
islation where there was no corresponding national provision. The Court 
neither looked at the substance of the European norm and its meaning 
19  The case law of the Lithuanian Supreme Court may be accessed at <www.lat.lt>; how-
ever, the decisions are available in Lithuanian only.
20  Judgment of the LSC of 14 September 1998 in Sirowa, no 3K-53/98.
21  Council Directive (EEC) 92/27 on the labelling of medicinal products for human use 
and on package leafl ets [1992] OJ L113/8, and Council Directive (EEC) 65/65 on the ap-
proximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to 
proprietary medicinal products [1965] OJ L22/369.
22  Judgment of 25 January 2000 in Birstono mineraliniai vandenys, no 3K-3-25/2000.
23  Art 2(2) Council Regulation (EEC) 2081/92 on the protection of geographical indications 
and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs [1992] OJ L208/1.
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in detail, nor dealt with the more general question of why it should apply 
such European law at all.24
Only in its third ‘EC law case’ - the Budejovicky Budvar case,25 also 
decided in 2000 - was the LSC more precise as to the reasons why it 
was referring to Community law before accession. This case, therefore, 
served as a precedent26 for all later cases in which EC law was mentioned 
(including some cases after accession). The LSC analysed the issue of 
confusion among consumers in detail, and based a large part of its argu-
mentation on EC law, as interpreted in the relevant practice of the ECJ. 
Only after having cited the relevant provisions of EC law in its decision 
(together with ECJ case law) did the LSC turn to the more substantial 
question: namely, the reasons and basis for applying Community law in 
the case before it. The Court’s argument was framed as follows: 
[T]aking into account the fact that contemporary intellectual proper-
ty rights are the outcome of a long process of unifi cation and harmo-
nisation in this area, and considering Lithuania’s objective of joining 
the EU and the need, resulting from this objective, to harmonise 
national law with EC law, the provision of the national Trademark 
Law […] must be interpreted in the light of EC law.27
Thus the main rationale for referring to Community law was, accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, Lithuania’s goal of EU accession. In the opin-
ion of Lithuanian scholars, the LSC tried by means of this case to send a 
message to lower courts, suggesting that they analyse whether a national 
provision at issue originated from EC law and, if so, that they interpret 
and apply this provision according to EC law.28 However, if this was in-
deed the LSC’s aim, it was not well refl ected in the judgment itself. EC 
law was referred to merely as an interpretative tool enabling a national 
24  However, to be fair one must mention that Sirowa (n 20) was actually a landmark judg-
ment in the sense that Lithuanian courts used the principle of proportionality in their ar-
gumentation for the fi rst time, thus starting a qualitative shift away from purely formalistic 
reliance on a written norm.
25  Judgment of 17 May 2000 in Anheuser-Busch Inc. v Budejovicky Budvar n.p., no 3K-3-
554/2000, the Lithuanian version of the worldwide trademark dispute between the Czech 
Budweiser beer and its American counterpart.
26  In the national legal system, precedents are not formally a source of law, although the 
signifi cance of judgments by the Supreme Court as an interpretative tool is growing. Virgili-
jus Valancius (ed), Commentary on the Code of Civil Procedure of Lithuania, Part I - Common 
Provisions (Justitia, Vilnius 2004) 44-45.
27  Sirowa (n 20). Similar statements were also made in later case law, eg Judgment of 7 
January 2003 in Smirnova, no 3K-3-167/2003, and Judgment of 15 December 2003 in 
Beecham Group, no 3K-3-1103/2003.
28  M Mikelenas, ‘Europos Sąjungos teisès (ir valstybės atsakomybės principo) taikymas Li-
etuvos Respublikos bendrosios kompetencijos teismuose’ [‘Application of EC law in Lithua-
nian courts of general jurisdiction’] (conference materials) (Justitia, Vilnius 2006).
314  Yvonne Goldammer & Elzé Matulionyté: Towards an Improved Application of European Union...
court, particularly with the help of ECJ case law, to clarify concepts of 
national (trademark) law which had no precise meaning in that law. The 
LSC neither attempted nor, it would seem, found it necessary to examine 
whether EC law itself could be a source of law prior to EU accession. The 
LSC’s case law would, in fact, support the opposite conclusion, since the 
LSC has never referred to Community law alone as a single legal source, 
but rather only in conjunction with one or several provisions of national 
or international law (such as the Paris Convention or TRIPS in trademark 
cases).
Given that the LSC has referred to Community law most often in 
conjunction with provisions from ‘ordinary’ international law, and also 
that the wording used in its judgments (for example, ‘as […] the Directive 
and other international law provides’,29 or ‘as explained by the practice of 
international courts’,30 where the ECJ’s case law was actually meant), it 
may be observed that the Court typically approaches EC law as ordinary 
international public law. Interestingly, the LSC has not found it necessary 
to differentiate between ‘normal’ international law (ie treaties to which 
Lithuania is a signatory) which, according to the Constitution, forms an 
integral part of the Lithuanian legal system, and EU directives and regu-
lations. It is not clear if the Court considers EU directives and regulations 
similar to treaties (ie a source of international law) or recommendations 
adopted by international organisations (ie international soft-law). It could 
be that this disregard for the special character of EC law also stems from 
a general perception of the European Union as merely an international 
organisation, and nothing more.31 As a consequence of simply treating 
the EU as an international organisation, the laws adopted by its institu-
tions are considered to be international law as well. On the other hand, 
placing Community law on an equal footing with international law has 
allowed the LSC to avoid going into detail as to why it should be applied. 
Moreover, it may be observed that even when the Court acknowledged 
the special character of EC law prior to accession, it was not clear what 
effects this should have had. At that time, national courts neither had an 
obligation to grant supremacy to EC law nor to apply it directly or with 
29  Already in one of its fi rst cases referring to EC law (namely, Birstono mineraliniai vande-
nys (n 22)) the Court gave an indication that it treats EC law as international law. Immedi-
ately after accession, it still repeated the same mantra, stating eg that ‘such requirements 
are set forth in international law, ie Directive […] and Regulation […]’ (see Judgment of 21 
December 2004 in UAB Gurda v UAB Narbutas ir Ko, no 2A-346/2004). The Court thus 
continued to ignore the specifi c nature of Community law.
30  Eg Budejovicky Budvar (n 25). 
31  Such an argument is also maintained in the general discussion on the status and place 
of EC law in the national legal systems of the new Eastern European Member States and, 
in particular, the Baltic States. See Anneli Albi, ‘“Europe” articles in the constitutions of 
Central and Eastern European countries’ (2005) 45 CMLR 416-418.
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full effect. EC law was made use of as a comparative source of ‘better law’, 
without too many considerations of a more general character (if at all). 
This was probably the best that the Court could do, given the status of 
EC law prior to accession, and bearing in mind its understanding of EC 
law and the integration process.
Another dozen cases were decided by the Lithuanian Supreme Court 
with reference to EC law before accession, inviting the optimistic conclu-
sion that Lithuanian courts were boldly preparing for their role as Eu-
ropean courts. However, their method of ‘applying’ Community law most 
often amounted to simple citation. The LSC used the text of EC legisla-
tive acts only as a source of formal comparison with the corresponding 
Lithuanian provisions. It never examined what the provision of the EC 
law to which it ‘referred’ actually meant or what its purpose was, nor 
did it examine the relevant ECJ case law in detail, thus demonstrating a 
rather formalistic approach which took into account only what was ex-
plicitly set forth in the legislative act. 
As already mentioned, the sphere of law where the LSC made use 
of EC law, at least as an interpretative instrument, in its own case law 
prior to accession was a rather narrow one, concerned almost exclusively 
with intellectual property rights (of the eighteen cases referring to EC law, 
fi fteen were IPR cases);32 and even within this area, the disputes in ques-
tion were limited mainly to trademark law. The reasons for such a nar-
row specialisation are several. First and perhaps foremost was the LSC’s 
insuffi cient competence, knowledge and practice, compared to the ECJ’s 
abundant and sophisticated case law. Not surprisingly, intellectual prop-
erty rights law was also among those areas where considerable changes 
were needed in order for Lithuania to qualify for accession, creating the 
conditions for the four freedoms while ensuring adequate protection of 
IPR. While the national regulatory framework for intellectual property 
rights has been developing continuously, the need for improved enforce-
ment by both institutions and courts has constantly been emphasised.33 
In the late nineties, of course, the LSC was faced with an increasing 
number of cases related to the use and misuse of trademarks and the an-
32  There have only been a very few (three) cases in other fi elds of law where EC law was 
touched upon. The fi rst, Sirowa, which has already been mentioned (n 20), dealt with defi -
nitions of a medicinal product. The second case concerned, among other things, spamming 
(Judgment of 10 October 2001 in Sėkmės sistemos, no 3K-3-927/2001) and the third re-
ferred to the Second Company Law Directive (Judgment of 4 June 2003 in Adomaitis et al 
v Mažeikių nafta, no 3K-3-650/2003). Whereas in the fi rst two cases only an interpretative 
reference was made to EC law, in the third the LSC explained that it was referring to the 
Directive because the explanatory memorandum to the national law at issue indicated that 
it was implementing the Company Law Directives.
33  See the Commission’s Annual Reports on Progress towards Accession <http://ec.europa.
eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/past_enlargements/eu10/lithuania_
en.htm> accessed 25 March 2007.
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nulment of their registration. Without waiting for the national Trademark 
Law to be fully harmonised with the Community’s more comprehensive 
trademark legislation, the LSC sought assistance in the relevant provi-
sions of EC law and, more importantly, ECJ practice. The Budejovicky 
Budvar case was already important not only for being the fi rst where the 
LSC elaborated somewhat on the application of EC law in general, but 
also as a pilot case for all its later case law in the area of trademarks and 
other intellectual property rights. In fact, many later cases both before 
and immediately after accession followed the same pattern established 
in the Budejovicky Budvar case, referring to the same ECJ case law and 
never bothering to look at other abundant case law (eg more recent and 
relevant cases in a particular dispute). 
To sum up, it could be argued that although the Lithuanian Supreme 
Court started applying Community law even before accession, the signifi -
cance of such ‘application’ is rather arguable. Besides the fact that the 
LSC’s application of EC law was limited almost exclusively to trademark 
cases, the Court did not set a clear rule explaining why EC law should be 
applied at all by Lithuanian courts, and in what manner.
Since Accession
During the fi rst two years since accession, the same problems as be-
fore accession persisted in the LSC’s case law. In addition to the fact that 
cases referring to EC law dealt with the same very limited area (trademark 
law), the LSC continued to neglect the specifi c nature of EC law in the fi rst 
years after accession. Moreover, the very fi rst attempts to apply Commu-
nity law in areas other than trademark law immediately revealed all the 
problems that national courts, which were used to a plain text-based read-
ing of the law, could and did face when forced to deal with EC directives. 
One may also fi nd certain indications that the fi rst post-accession 
cases were pervaded by the accession euphoria that overwhelmed Lithua-
nian society in 2004. In the LSC’s case law, this emerges in the form of a 
baseless eagerness to apply any Community law provision to which the 
parties might refer, despite its (probably) being irrelevant. Thus in 2004 
the Court came up with some brilliant examples of how EC law should 
not be applied. It ignored the fact that the parties in a given case (both 
private individuals) referred to a directive more than a year before its im-
plementation date,34 or that the event from which the dispute arose had 
happened well before accession35 (yet was not continuing at the time of 
34  Judgment of 12 May 2004 in Lietuvos medicųinos darbuotojų profesinė są junga, no 3K-
3-301/2004.
35  Namely, a public tender for purchasing certain products; see Judgment of 3 November 
2004 in Vitrolabo servisas, no 3K-3-597/2004.
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the hearing, thus giving no cause for EC law to have any real effect). Al-
though the Court’s argumentation may look more impressive when sup-
ported by a larger number of different provisions, even those of EC law 
(!), it seems a little superfl uous to cite everything with the same keywords 
without examining whether the given situation truly falls within the scope 
of a particular EC law provision.
Obviously, the core reason for such incorrect use of Community law 
lies in the LSC’s insuffi cient competence in and knowledge of EC matters, 
despite its willingness to have a position regarding them. This could be 
seen during the fi rst round of the national judges’ training programme 
on EC law in 2004,36 where the main message for judges was that they 
now had to apply EC law as well. However, they either overheard the part 
about how Community law was to be applied, or else this did not interest 
the people leading the courses. Moreover, if examined in greater depth 
it is clear that to a rather formalist judge, who normally just reads and 
applies legislative texts as such, it will seem quite unusual that certain 
conceptual pre-conditions (eg the direct applicability of directives, as de-
veloped by the ECJ) must be met in order for legislative provisions to be 
applied. It appears that the judges enthusiastically accepted the fact that 
they were now responsible for applying another 80,000 pages of legisla-
tive text, whether national or ‘European’, and started using them just 
like any other laws. The more general principles established by the ECJ 
regarding the functioning of Community law were not initially a concern. 
And least on their minds was the idea that the rationale behind Commu-
nity law was, fi rst and foremost, European integration, and that it was in 
this light that it should be interpreted and applied. Only at the very end 
of 2006 did the LSC refuse to directly apply the provisions of a directive 
on the ground that its implementation period had not yet expired at the 
time of the events in dispute,37 and that the preconditions for direct appli-
cation of the directive had not been met - issues to which the lower court, 
whose decision was being appealed, had not paid attention.
Another point worth noting is that, during the fi rst three years of 
its obligation to apply EC law, not one single aspect of EC law has posed 
the LSC with a serious enough question for it to make a preliminary 
reference. It would seem logical that, in the fi rst years of dealing with a 
previously unknown volume of law (or one known only to a very limited 
extent), the Court would have many questions on this new law which it 
is now to apply. However, the LSC’s practice demonstrates rather the op-
posite: the less one knows, the fewer questions one has. Even when mak-
ing obvious mistakes concerning EC law, the LSC has never tried to seek 
36  For more about the training of national judges, see note 90 below.
37  Judgment of 20 November 2006 in R. J. and T. R. v Viti, no 3K-3-592/2006.
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assistance from the ECJ. In its attempt to puzzle out EC issues on its 
own, the LSC has never recalled the CILFIT38 formula of acte clair, which 
states that a national court is freed from the obligation to refer if the cor-
rect application of EC law is so obvious that no reasonable doubt exists, 
not only for the referring court itself but also for the ECJ and the courts 
of other Member States (should they deal with the same matter). On the 
contrary, in relying merely on some provision of EC law (and not on ECJ 
case law with respect to this provision), the LSC has never explained why 
it believes that the scope and subject matter of the given provision should 
be interpreted as it does. The LSC’s judges do not seem to worry that the 
provision to which they refer could have a different meaning for the ECJ. 
The LSC has neither made a single reference ex offi cio, nor acted on any 
request by the parties to a dispute to refer a question to the ECJ.39 In the 
only case where the LSC refused to make a preliminary request, its refus-
al was based on having already interpreted the matters in question in its 
earlier (pre-accession) case law, whose reasoning was based on ECJ case 
law. In light of the acte clair doctrine, such an excuse is obviously not 
valid, since the LSC’s refusal to refer was not directly based on whether 
the ECJ’s case law was clear on this issue, but rather on the fact that 
the LSC’s case law on this issue was well-founded. However, three years 
after accession is obviously too short a period for launching a Köbler-type 
procedure for damages due to the erroneous application of EC law and 
failure to refer to the ECJ.
It was not until 2006 that the LSC had an opportunity to make its 
long-awaited more general statement regarding the application of Com-
munity law, having begun to analyse and reconsider the grounds for its 
application and questions of supremacy. However, the LSC has had diffi -
culties in deciding on which particular grounds it must grant supremacy 
to Community law in its judgments. So far it has followed several quite 
different lines of reasoning on this issue. The fi rst (not surprisingly) is 
viewed through the prism of international law. In the Bleiras case,40 de-
cided in early 2006, in which national courts refused civil jurisdiction on 
the grounds that the dispute did not fall within the scope of special ju-
risdiction under the Brussels Regulation, the appellant claimed that the 
national Civil Procedure Code should apply instead of the Regulation. In 
this case the LSC was thus forced to analyse the relationship between the 
38  Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanifi cio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982] 
ECR 3415 para 16.
39  Judgment of 27 September 2004 in UAB Samsonas v AB Panerių investicijos, no 3K-3-
461/2004.
40  Judgment of 6 March 2006 in Bleiras, no 3K-3-170/2006. This judgment was adopted 
a week earlier than the judgment (n 18) in which the Constitutional Court confi rmed that 
according to the Constitution (ie the Constitutional Act) EC law should prevail in the event 
of a confl ict.
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Regulation and the national code. Although the Court naturally granted 
primacy to the Regulation, its reasoning was fairly awkward. It began 
with the general observation that procedure in international civil pro-
ceedings is regulated both by national law and international treaties, and 
that the Civil Procedure Code applies to such proceedings unless a bi-
lateral or multilateral agreement to which Lithuania is a party provides 
otherwise. The Court then went on to state that Lithuania had become a 
Member State of the EU based on a multilateral treaty which empowers 
EU institutions to adopt various legal acts. Based on this, the LSC drew 
the conclusion that, pursuant to this international treaty, the Brussels 
Regulation is a source of law in civil proceedings and, therefore, should 
apply in situations falling within its scope. This line of reasoning is quite 
concise, and helps the LSC reach the desired result; however, it confi rms 
the obligation to apply EC law in a roundabout way, rather than relying 
on EC law itself, or at least on the national constitution.
The second line of reasoning is based on national provisions for the 
application of Community law. In the Dekont case,41 the Court was faced 
with the opposite situation to that above, ie one in which the lower courts 
had applied the national Civil Procedure Code instead of the Regulation 
on the Service of Judicial Documents.42 In this case (which, like the previ-
ous one, dealt with ‘European civil procedure’), the LSC followed a logic 
whereby the Regulation was to be applied not because it proceeds from 
an international treaty, but simply because the Civil Procedure Code (in 
its ‘accession articles’, as mentioned above43) states that EC law should 
apply in civil proceedings. This change in reasoning may have been infl u-
enced by the decisions of the Constitutional Court,44 which cited the Con-
stitutional Act and pointed out that EC law is an integral part of the legal 
system and must be applied. However, it could also represent merely an-
other inconsistency in reasoning among the LSC’s different chambers. 
In this same case, the LSC also dealt for the fi rst time with the su-
premacy of EC law. The Court annulled the lower court decisions on the 
grounds that, by applying national law instead of an EC regulation, they 
failed to grant primacy to Community law. However simple this case may 
appear (for it is obvious that, having a directly applicable regulation, a 
national court should apply it, rather than a provision of a national law), 
it is laudable that the Court at least mentioned the primacy of EC law. In 
earlier cases it had referred to provisions of Community law mainly when 
these confi rmed what was stated by the provisions of national law, and so 
41  Judgment of 29 December 2006 in Dekont, no 3K-3-690/2006.
42  Council Regulation (EC) 1348/2000 on the service in the Member States of judicial and 
extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters [2000] OJ L160/37.
43  Law on Courts (n 12).
44  See n 18.
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questions of confl ict or supremacy had never been touched upon. As one 
would expect, of course, the LSC was not precise as to the grounds from 
which this supremacy proceeds. It referred neither to the ECJ’s case law, 
as the basis of primacy in EC law, nor to the Constitutional Act and the 
case law of the Constitutional Court,45 as the basis of primacy in national 
law. Therefore, while employing the principle of the supremacy of Commu-
nity law for the fi rst time, the Court accepted it as a natural and self-evi-
dent principle, such that no precise reasoning was needed to support it.
Despite the fact that the LSC’s application of EC law deserves much 
criticism, the development of its case law regarding intellectual property 
rights permits a more optimistic view. Bearing in mind that trademark 
law was the fi rst area in which the LSC applied EC law, it has now de-
veloped a fairly comprehensive argumentation and reasoning based on 
issues related to Community law and on ECJ and CFI practice. Since 
late 2005, the LSC has constantly referred to the newer case law of the 
ECJ, the CIF and also the OHIM in trademark cases, shifting from cita-
tion of very basic concepts and defi nitions (eg the defi nition of ‘average 
consumer’46) to more particular aspects of trademark law (eg the specifi cs 
of three-dimensional trademarks47). A slow but steady improvement in 
reasoning based on EC law in trademark cases, refl ected in an increas-
ing use of case law and a more detailed analysis of the real meaning and 
context of the given EC law provisions, permits the assumption that a 
more coherent and correct application of EC law might be extended to 
other areas of the Court’s jurisdiction as well. The areas of law where 
improvement may be seen next would presumably be those regarded as 
the second and third largest groups of cases: namely, the application of 
European civil procedure, and public procurement contracts.
EU Administrative Law
Administrative law is undoubtedly one of the most important areas 
of application of EC law in Lithuania, in that its regulation has been 
broadly infl uenced and amended by various EC legal instruments. There-
fore, it is not surprising that connections to EC law can be found in the 
decisions of the state authorities and administrative courts. Before focus-
ing in depth on one such area, competition law, a more general overview 
of the importance and role of EC law in the decisions of the Lithuanian 
Supreme Administrative Court (LSAC) will be given. 
45  Ibid.
46  Judgment of 7 January 2003 in P.A. Smirnova v Guiness UDV North America, no 3K-3-
167/2003.
47  Judgment of 2 May 2006 in Latvijas Balzams, no 3K-3-275/2006; Judgment of 23 
March 2005 in Unilever N.V. v UAB Varta, no 3K-3-150/2005.
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Before Lithuania’s accession to the European Union in May 2004, 
the LSAC had already started to explore EC law in its decisions. Accord-
ing to its own offi cial data, in the 2001 - 2004 period the LSAC made use 
of provisions and principles in the area of European human rights,48 and 
referred to conventions protecting fundamental rights in 45 of the cases 
it decided.49 This trend has continued in the past few years as well.50 
Besides this, EC law has been referred to since the year 2002 in some 
decisions, especially in the area of competition law.51
In 2003, shortly before accession, the Court issued a quite criti-
cal evaluation that the application of EC law in the areas of taxation, 
customs, competition, health protection, environmental protection and 
agriculture would be very diffi cult without strong specialisation in these 
areas, due to their detailed regulation. In order to be well prepared for 
this challenge, the Court formed a department with special competence 
in all cases where aspects of international law were involved. Continuing 
education for judges had already begun in 2003, with a special library 
also founded for that purpose.52 Contacts were established with other, 
more experienced administrative courts, such as those of Sweden and 
Finland, so that Lithuanian courts could learn from their experience.53
After Lithuania’s accession to the European Union, both the inten-
sity and quality of the LSAC’s application of EC law improved. In its 2004 
annual report, the Court stated that becoming a member of the European 
Union court system was the most important event for it in that year, 
since from then on it not only had the right and obligation to apply EC 
law, but also obligations towards the EU itself, namely, contributing to 
the development of EC law through its jurisdiction.54 It should be said 
that the LSAC has shown some awareness of the meaning of EU acces-
sion in its reports. In 2004 it evaluated its own application of EC law 
and the principles developed in practice by the ECJ as ‘good practice’ for 
48  See eg Judgment of 9 November 2004 in A. Songaila v Lietuvos Respublikos vidaus 
reikalų ministerija, no A3-750-2004.
49  Lietuvos Vyriausiasis Administracinis Teismas Metinis Pranešimas 2004 [2004 Annu-
al Report of the Lithuanian Supreme Administrative Court] <http://www.lvat.lt/default.
aspx?item=mpran&id=5853> accessed 15 April 2007.
50  See eg Judgment of 14 April 2006 in L.G. v J.K. and V.V., no N3-443/2006.
51  For a broader discussion, see the section on competition law below.
52  Lietuvos Vyriausiasis Administracinis Teismas Metinis Pranešimas 2003 [2003 Annu-
al Report of the Lithuanian Supreme Administrative Court] <http://www.lvat.lt/default.
aspx?item=mpran&id=5807> accessed 15 April 2007; Lietuvos Vyriausiasis Administrac-
inis Teismas Metinis Pranešimas 2005 [2005 Annual Report of the Lithuanian Supreme 
Administrative Court] <http://www.lvat.lt/default.aspx?item=mpran&id=5885> accessed 
15 April 2007.
53  2004 Annual Report (n 49) and 2005 Annual Report (n 52). 
54  2005 Annual Report (n 52).
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interpreting and clarifying national law provisions,55 although there was 
neither an indication of what the term ‘good practice’ meant nor when 
and on what grounds the Court had applied such ‘good practice’. In its 
2005 annual report, the LSAC further stated that it had directly applied 
EC law in more than 20 cases in 2005.56 According to this report, it had 
applied EC law especially intensively in the areas of taxation and compe-
tition law. 
Despite all the LSAC’s efforts and the importance it assigns to cor-
rectly applying EC law, as well as judges’ ongoing education and partici-
pation in seminars, conferences and projects, diffi culties concerning the 
status, interpretation and application of EC law are still encountered to-
day. When assessing the practical results of the Court’s application of EC 
law, however, one should bear in mind that the whole system of adminis-
trative courts in Lithuania began functioning only in the year 1999, and 
that the LSAC started working only in 2001. Thus administrative courts 
have had to clear a double hurdle: while they were still gaining experience 
in applying administrative law in general, a totally new system of law, ie 
EC law, now had to be applied. Their experience with administrative law 
as a separate legal area, as well as with its application, must still be re-
garded as small compared to that of other EU Member States. 
Some examples of the LSAC’s practice will show the positive and 
negative sides of the ‘use’ of EC law in its judgments. Both shortly before 
and soon after accession, the Court took into account the application 
of relevant general principles of EC law in certain cases concerning the 
development of general principles under Lithuanian law. One example 
was its interpretation of the principle of proportionality, where it stated 
that this principle is not solely a national principle, but also one devel-
oped by the ECJ’s jurisprudence. It therefore clarifi ed certain national 
provisions by reference to those under EC law and one judgment by the 
ECJ.57 Likewise, when discussing the principle of fi scal neutrality and 
defi ning its essence, the LSAC referred to a decision by the ECJ.58 When 
the content of the principle of non-discrimination59 also needed to be 
clarifi ed, reference was made to Art 12 EC and one case decided by the 
ECJ, thus establishing the content of this principle in the Lithuanian 
Civil Code. Although the given case was not connected to EC law, the 
55  Ibid.
56  2005 Annual Report (n 52).
57  Judgment of 20 February 2004 in Bitė GSM v Ryšių reguliavimo tarnyba prie Lietuvos 
Respublikos Vyriausybės, no A1-362-2004. 
58  Judgment of 27 January 2004 in UAB ‘Tauja’ v Valstybinė mokesËių inspekcija, no A1-
355-2004.
59  Judgment of 28 January 2004 in AB ‘Žemaitijos pienas‘ v Žemės ūkio ministerija, no I1-
08-2004.
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Court noted that the principle’s content under EC law was similar to 
that defi ned in the Constitution of the Lithuanian Republic. In all these 
cases, the LSAC’s good intention to apply Lithuanian law in accordance 
with European law may be recognised. However, it is not very clear why 
and on what grounds the LSAC decided to refer to European principles in 
cases concerning the interpretation of purely national law, and what kind 
of systematic approach it followed in so doing. This has not only led to 
unclearness and non-transparency, but also creates the impression that 
EC law was chosen unsystematically in order to apply national law where 
its provisions and/or principles were insuffi cient or not yet developed to 
the necessary extent. 
New national laws on taxation came into force on the day of Lithua-
nia’s accession to the EU, and several cases soon arose concerning VAT. 
The disputes in some of these cases had begun even before European leg-
islation came into force in Lithuania. Nevertheless, in several such cases 
the Court used EC directives concerning VAT as ‘secondary sources’ to 
clarify the essence of VAT provisions in national legislation.60 The LSAC 
did take into account the fact that EC law was not in force at the time 
when the dispute arose. However, it did not further defi ne the term ‘sec-
ondary sources’ or their exact role, but rather simply used them as an 
interpretative tool. The same can be observed for customs regulations, 
since the entire customs regime changed upon accession to the Euro-
pean Union.61 In reviewing these cases, one has the impression that the 
LSAC again took advantage of the principles and interpretation of EC law 
to defi ne the essence of the corresponding national principles and provi-
sions and interpret them. 
One more interesting example from the beginning of 2006 may be 
cited here, in which the LSAC again had to decide a case concerning VAT 
issues. The Court referred to Directive 77/388/EC to defi ne the term ‘tax 
unit’ with respect to VAT payments, stating that, in order to ensure uni-
form interpretation throughout the EU (which was the Directive’s aim), 
the provisions of national law had to be defi ned according to the Direc-
tive and its interpretation in ECJ case law. The LSAC further extensively 
discussed not only the provisions of the Directive but also the latest ECJ 
60  See UAB ‘Tauja’ v Valstybinė mokesËių  inspekcija (n 58), Judgment of 9 February 2006 in 
Ignalinos atominė elektrinė v Valstybinė mokesËiËių  inspekcija, no A4-779/2006, and Judg-
ment of 6 February 2006 in Galintai ir partneriai v Valstybinė mokesËiËių inspekcija, no 
A1-794/2006, where the Court stated that although the relevant EC law had no force in 
Lithuania at the time when the confl ict arose, and can therefore only be used as a second-
ary tool for interpreting national provisions, the EU provisions and ECJ case law were ap-
plicable at the time when the case was decided.
61  See eg Judgment of 17 November 2004 in S. Žarskus v VRM ©iauliËių  rinktinė , no N9-961-
2004; Judgment of 9 November 2005 in UAB ‘Galinta ir partneriai’ prieš Muitinės departa-
mentËią  prie Lietuvos Respublikos fi nansËių  ministerijos, no A14-1699/2005.
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judgments based thereon.62 This can be seen as a sign of real develop-
ment and a new practice in which ECJ cases are not just referred to in 
order to support the Court’s position; rather, the arguments contained 
therein are given due consideration, and the Court seeks to interpret and 
apply national law in light of EC law and practice. 
In another case concerning application of the TIR Convention, the 
Court, with the help of the ECJ’s judgment in case C-266/01,63 exam-
ined whether the relation between the parties to the case were of a civil 
or an administrative nature. The Court referred to ECJ case law at the 
very end of its judgment, as proof that the arguments and principles it 
had developed were going in the right direction. Disregarding the fact 
that the ECJ came to rather the opposite conclusion from the LSAC in 
its judgment (based, of course, on a different factual situation), the LSAC 
only briefl y examined the statements supporting its reasoning. However, 
it might have been more helpful if the Court had referred to the relevant 
ECJ judgment earlier, and afterwards pointed out the different facts in 
the case before it.64 
In a case brought against the Lithuanian authority administering 
the European agriculture and rural development programme (SAPARD), 
the LSAC had to defi ne a ‘long-term village resident’, ie a person eligible 
for receiving funds under the programme.65 The Court defi ned this term 
according to an interpretation of the corresponding term ‘long-term in-
habitant’ in the Lithuanian Civil Code. Here one might ask whether it 
would not have been better for the Court to fi nd a uniform European in-
terpretation to apply the programme in a uniform European way, instead 
of resorting to an interpretation of national provisions.66 
At the end of 2005, the LSAC decided to seek a preliminary rul-
ing under Article 234 EC, asking the ECJ whether the wording of the 
Lithuanian provision implementing Article 27 paragraph 1 of Directive 
92/83/EC was in conformity with the Directive.67 The LSAC thus became 
62  See Judgment of 6 February 2006 in Galintai ir partneriai v Valstybinė mokesËių  in-
spekcija, no A1-794/2006.
63  Case C266/01 Préservatrice foncière TIARD SA v Staat der Nederlanden [2003] ECR I-
4867.
64  Judgment of 25 November 2005 in Lietuvos nacionalinė vežėjų automobiliais asociacija 
‘Linava’ prieš Muitinės departamentą prie Lietuvos Respublikos fi nansų ministerijos, Kauno 
teritorinę muitinę, no A14-1479/2005.
65  Judgment of 10 June 2005 in Asociacija ‘MaceviËių palivarko bendruomenė’ prieš Na-
cionalinę mokėjimo agentūrą prie Žemės ūkio ministerijos, no A6-16/2005.
66  Another case on infringement of the conditions of this same programme was decided in 
2006; see Judgment of 20 February 2006 in Daumantų skanėstai v Nacionalinė mokėjimo 
agentūra, no A2-687/2006.
67  Judgment of 20 December 2005 in UAB ‘Profi sa’ v Muitinės departamentą prie Lietuvos 
Respublikos fi nansų ministerijos, no A15-1292/2005.
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the fi rst national court to make use of the procedure under Article 234 
EC.68 
Concluding this overview of administrative law, it may be said that, 
while the application of EC law has changed for the better in certain ar-
eas of law, the situation still cannot be called satisfactory. There is still 
no clarity regarding the application of EC law in cases that arose before 
May 2004. While the Court invokes EC law more often, the grounds for 
applying it are not always clear, and its application is still not done in the 
correct manner. 
IN FOCUS: COMPETITION LAW69
Like many of the new Member States, Lithuania also had to undergo 
serious legal changes in the fi eld of competition law following independ-
ence, due to the establishment of a totally new economic system.70 The 
Competition Law had already been adopted in 1992, 12 years before the 
country’s accession to the EU, and a public authority had been empow-
ered to supervise its application. As a result of the Europe Agreement, 
this law was amended two times, in 1999 and 2004.71 Today the institu-
tion responsible for supervising application and enforcement of the Com-
petition Law is the Lithuanian Competition Council.72 Decisions by the 
Council can be appealed to the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court73 
and the Lithuanian Supreme Administrative Court.74 
68  On 19 April 2007 the ECJ decided in case C-63/06 that the concerns of the LSAC were 
justifi ed, ruling that the Lithuanian provision violated Directive 92/83/EC. Hopefully this 
will be an incentive for Lithuanian courts to use the possibility of reference under Art 234 
EC more often - but only when there is really a need, and after having analysed the relevant 
EC law in detail themselves.
69  In this section, the authors focus on decisions adopted on the basis of Articles 81 and 
82 EC and the corresponding Lithuanian provisions. There are several decisions by the LCC 
and the LSAC in the area of unfair competition, especially advertising, in which EC law was 
applied in order to defi ne terms in Lithuanian laws and establish their proper application; 
see eg Judgment of 17 November 2005 in UAB ‘Tele 2’ v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos 
tarybą, no A1-931/2005, where the term ‘consumer’ was defi ned in a case of misleading 
advertising.
70  See also Jens Hölscher & Johannes Stephan, ‘Competition Policy in Central Eastern 
Europe in the Light of EU Accession’ (2004) 42 JCMS 323, 325.
71  Amended in 1999 (Offi cial Gazette 1999, no 30-856) and in 2004 (Offi cial Gazette 2004, 
no 63-2244). 
72  Hereinafter also LCC.
73  See www.vat.lt .
74  See www.lvat.lt.
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Application of EC Law before Accession
From the very outset, the LCC chose a progressive approach to im-
plementing and applying European Community law.75 As one of the rea-
sons justifying this approach, the LCC referred to the Lithuanian Consti-
tution, whose Article 4776 contains the principle of protecting the freedom 
of fair competition. Therefore, it stated, neither the LCC nor the relevant 
courts faced any dilemma about making trade-offs among confl icting ob-
jectives.77 
Despite the fact that the only ‘obligation’ to consider EC law was 
contained in Article 1 paragraph 3 of Lithuania’s Competition Law, which 
states that the Law’s aim is harmonisation with EC competition law, as 
early as 2000 the LCC had begun to rely on EC law in its decisions. Five 
of its seventeen published decisions in the 2000 - 2003 period can be 
seen to make reference to the practice of the ECJ and the Commission. 
In its very fi rst decision against Lithuanian Telecom, which was followed 
by several others,78 the LCC referred mainly to ECJ case law, stating that 
one of the aims of the national law was harmonisation with EC law.79 
The reasoning in these decisions was usually very brief, with only a 
little attention devoted to legal arguments,80 while the basis of the Coun-
cil’s reasoning in European practice has more or less been repeated in 
a pragmatic, standardised way. At that time, application of EC law con-
sisted mainly in reference to one or two European decisions, without any 
deeper analysis - or even any at all - of these decisions and the related 
facts in the case before the Council. In some of its decisions, the LCC ap-
plied the same principles established by the provisions of EC competition 
law without, however, making any reference to it. For example, in a case 
against two petrol stations concerning a concerted practice on a price-fi x-
ing cartel,81 the LCC did not refer to EC law or ECJ decisions in its own 
ruling, although that would have been very helpful, as this was one of 
the fi rst decisions in Lithuania whose subject was a concerted practice. 
When the case was brought before the administrative courts, the Council 
75  The aim of harmonising Lithuanian competition law and policy with EC law was already 
enshrined in Art 1 para 3 of the 1999 version of the Competition Law. 
76  Art 46 of the Lithuanian Constitution (Offi cial Gazette 1992, no 33-1014).
77  ‘The Objectives of Competition Law and the Optimal Design of a Competition Authority 
within the Overall Government’, OECD Global Forum on Competition 2003 <http://www.
konkuren.lt/english/international/oecd.htm> accessed 28 November 2006.
78  Eg Decision of 18 May 2001 in Mažeikių nafta, no 8/b.
79  This was additionally based on Article 64 of the Europe Agreement.
80  Although not included in this article, the same can be said for merger decisions by the 
LCC, although it could be argued that this approach does follow the Commission’s practice 
in merger cases. 
81  Decision of 28 December 2000 in Lietuvos kuras, no 18/b.
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referred to the need to harmonise Lithuanian law with EC law, basing 
its argumentation on the latter during the appeal.82 Notwithstanding the 
LCC’s argumentation referring to EC law in several such cases, the ad-
ministrative courts hearing appeals against LCC decisions in most of the 
cases brought between 2000 and 2004 - and, in fact, upholding those 
decisions - did not mention or consider the Council’s arguments relating 
to EC law in their reasoning.83 
However, two more positive examples can be found.84 In one of these 
cases, the application of EC law as such was in dispute, based on the 
argument that, according to Article 138 of the Lithuanian Constitution, 
EC law could not be applied because it is regarded as international law 
which has not been ratifi ed by the Parliament of the Republic of Lithua-
nia, and therefore has not become part of the Lithuanian legal system. 
The LSAC replied that no international legal acts had been applied in 
violation of the Constitution, since the LCC referred to EC law only as a 
tool for interpreting Lithuanian legal provisions in an international con-
text, which only showed that the LCC had reviewed the case exhaustively 
and from all sides.85 The LSAC further stated that Lithuanian law did not 
prohibit reference to EC law and that, besides, EC law had been applied 
not as binding law, but rather as law having the character of a recom-
mendation.86
When reviewing judgments by administrative courts from this peri-
od, the reasons behind their statements are often unclear, either because 
well-founded argumentation is lacking or the courts simply confi rm the 
Council’s decisions without an adequate explanation.87 This led to non-
transparency and legal uncertainty regarding the application and validity 
of EC law during this period. However, it can also be observed that in 
most national cases little attention was devoted in written decisions to 
legal reasoning in general or the arguments made by the parties. Other 
82  Judgment of 3 December 2002 in AB ‘Lietuvos kuras’ v Lietuvos Respublikos konkuren-
cijos taryba, no I-1045-2001.
83  Three examples where EC law was not even mentioned, although the LCC had referred 
to it: Decision of 11 April 2002 in Dėl AB ‘Klaipėdos jūrų krovinių  kompanija’ veiksmų  ati-
tikimo Konkurencijos į statymo 9 straipsnio 3 punkto reikalavimus, no 5/b; Decision of 28 
December 2000 in Dėl įmonių, veikianËių fotografavimo paslaugų rinkoje, veiksmų atitikimo 
Konkurencijos įstatymo Nr. VIII - 1099 5 straipsnio 1 dalies 1 punkto nuostatoms, no 19/b; 
Judgment of 27 June 2001 in AB ‘Lietuvos telekomas’ v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos 
taryba, no A-612-01. 
84  See Judgment of 16 May 2002 in Specializuota komplektavimo valdyba, no A-451/2002; 
Decision of 21 February 2002 in Lietuvos telekomas, no 2/b; Judgment of 11 June 2003 in 
Lietuvos telekomas, no A-530/2003.
85  Judgment of 11 June 2003 (n 84).
86  Judgment of 16 May 2002 (n 84).
87  More broadly, see Y Goldammer & E Matulionytė, ‘The Application of European Union 
Law in Lithuania’ (2006) 31 EL Rev 260-270.
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reasons for the inadequate application of EC law might include the dif-
fering level of knowledge of EC law in the Lithuanian Competition Coun-
cil, compared with that of Lithuanian courts, since at a very early stage 
(in 1999) the Council had started exchange projects with the European 
Commission, OECD and twinning programmes,88 which it considered the 
best way of supporting effective implementation of competition policy and 
enforcing the law with regard to the acquis communautaire.89 Although 
long-term training seminars for judges in all branches of the court sys-
tem did exist, these programmes amounted to only 26 hours in 2004, 
while in 2005 no separate seminars on European Community law were 
planned,90 although these EC law seminars have continued in 2006 and 
2007. For judges used to reviewing cases under national law, another to-
tally new situation arose following the introduction of a separate admin-
istrative court system. This led to a certain reluctance to apply unknown 
legal sources and instruments,91 as may be seen in several judgments 
where the courts decided cases on different legal grounds than those 
found in EC law.92 
Application of EC Law since Accession
Only slight changes can be observed following accession in 2004, as 
well as at the beginning of 2005. However, the beginning of a truly posi-
tive change can be found in the LSAC’s decision of June 2004 concerning 
the abuse of a company’s dominant position in the Lithuanian mineral 
oil market.93 For the fi rst time, the Court responded more extensively 
to the parties’ arguments, also taking into consideration the practice of 
European institutions and the application of principles enshrined in EC 
law when evaluating the arguments of the lower court. Referring to the 
88  PHARE project ‘Support to European Integration in Lithuania’ and PHARE twinning 
project ‘Strengthening Enforcement of Competition Policy’, Annual Report 2000, Foreword 
<http://www.konkuren.lt/english/annual/2000.htm> accessed 15 April 2007.
89  ‘Technical Assistance. General Overview’, Lithuanian Contribution to OECD Global Fo-
rum 2002 <http://www.konkuren.lt/english/international/oecd.htm> accessed 15 April 
2007.
90  Decision of the National Court Administration of 16 January 2004 (no 178) on the 
2004 Judges’ Training Programme <http://www.teismai.lt/savivalda/nutarimai_visi.asp> 
accessed 30 March 2007; see also recommendation by the EU Accession Monitoring Pro-
gram of the Open Society Institute, ‘Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Capacity 
2002’, 151 <http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/judicial> accessed 30 March 2007. In 
its Annual Reports, the Commission has recommended improvements in this sector in both 
2002 and 2003 (COM (2002) 0700 fi nal and COM (2003) 0675 fi nal).
91  ValanËius (n 3) 29.
92  Also interesting is the Judgment of 13 September 2002 in AB ‘Klaipėdos jūrų krovinių 
kompanija’, no A-871-02. 
93  Decision of 18 May 2001 in Mažeikių nafta, no 8/b; Judgment of 3 June 2004 in UAB 
‘Lukoil Baltija’, no P-82/2004.
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aim of Lithuania’s Competition Law under its Article 1 paragraph 3, ie 
harmonising national and EC competition law, the Court stated that ac-
tions prohibited under the Law, namely, prohibited agreements and the 
abuse of a dominant position, have a differing legal content. Further, it 
explained the defi nition of prohibited agreements under Article 5 of the 
Law and the abuse of a dominant position under its Article 9, also refer-
ring to the corresponding Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. Another 
case was concerned with the Lithuanian Post’s abuse of its dominant 
position. Here the LCC did not invoke EC cases or laws in its decision. 
However, as in previous cases, arguments made during the appeals were 
based on cases decided at the EU level. Unlike in many previous cases, 
both the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court and the LSAC responded 
to these arguments, additionally applying EC legal sources, directives 
concerning postal services, and Commission decisions ex offi cio.94 This 
positive development has continued since then, and the amount of deci-
sions cited and EC law analysed is growing.95 
One very interesting decision adopted by the LCC in 2006 concerned 
a concerted practice in the Lithuanian paper market. The LCC not only 
examined this practice under Article 5 of Lithuania’s Competition Law, 
but also applied Article 81 EC directly to the national law. Its extensive 
argumentation focused on direct application of Article 81 EC and the 
effect on trade among Member States in the case. Since the concerted 
practice had existed since 1999, however, Article 81 could be applied 
directly only after 1 May 2004, and thus activities after May 2004 were 
examined separately.96
The cases decided by the LCC in 2007 have so far mainly concerned 
prohibited agreements during a public tender.97 The interpretation of na-
tional competition law provisions is always combined with reference to 
EC competition law cases regarding Article 81 EC, stating that national 
law is identical in substance to the EC provisions, and that interpretation 
94  Decision of 5 January 2006 in Dėl AB ‘Lietuvos paštas’ veiksmų atitikties Lietuvos Re-
spublikos konkurencijos įstatymo 9 straipsnio reikalavimams, no 2S-01; Judgment of 22 
December 2006 in Lietuvos Paštas v Konkurencijos Taryba, no A2-2207/2006.
95  Decision of 5 May 2005 in Dėl Taksi paslaugų teikėjų asociacijos, no 2S-3; Judgment of 
11 May 2006 in UAB ‘Taksvija’ a.o. v Konkurencijos Taryba, no A1-686/2006.
96  Decision of 26 October 2006 in Dėl popieriumi prekiaujanËių ūkio subjektų veiksmų atitik-
ties Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos įstatymo 5 straipsnio ir Europos Bendrijos steigimo 
sutarties 81 straipsnio reikalavimams, no 2S-13.
97  Decision of 15 March 2007 in Dėl ūkio subjektų, dalyvavusių Klaipėdos miesto savivaldybės 
švietimo įstaigų ūkio tarnybos 2005-2006 m. organizuotuose viešËjų pirkimų konkursuose, 
veiksmų atitikties konkurencijos įstatymo 5 straipsnio reikalavimams, no 2S-6; the same 
can be said for the Decision of 1 February 2007 in Dėl ūkio subjektų, dalyvavusių šilumos 
punktų keitimo darbų konkurse, veiksmų atitikties Konkurencijos įstatymo 5 straipsnio reika-
lavimams, no 2S-3. 
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of EC law may thus serve as an example when reviewing the situation in 
Lithuanian cases.
All of the LCC’s more recent decisions, especially that of 26 October 
2006,98 show a growing self-confi dence, willingness and understanding 
concerning the application of EC law in the area of competition law. One 
can, therefore, observe a tendency towards ever-increasing application of 
EC law, in terms of both quality and quantity.
Conclusion
Having summarised the application of EC law by the Lithuanian 
Supreme Court in the area of civil jurisdiction, particularly intellectual 
property rights, on the one hand, and the Lithuanian Supreme Admin-
istrative Court and the Lithuanian Competition Council, with a special 
focus on competition law, on the other, the authors conclude that the 
application of EC law in the areas under consideration is far from ideal. 
In most cases, courts have not yet developed a general view of Com-
munity law as a sui generis system of law. There are still diffi culties in 
distinguishing between EC law and ordinary international law. Instead of 
referring to the specifi c nature of EC law, which is accepted in both con-
stitutional jurisprudence and national legislation, courts treat EC law as 
something analogous to international law. The principles set forth by the 
ECJ concerning the ‘ideal’ application of Community law by the national 
judiciary have apparently not yet been fully comprehended by Lithua-
nia’s courts. While they seem to have learned that supremacy must be 
given to EC law, in most cases they are unable to consistently incorporate 
reasoning based on such supremacy into their judgments. 
However, when these two ‘pioneer’ fi elds of EC law application are 
analysed, it is obvious that changes are gradually occurring. The fi rst ex-
amples of application by both supreme courts were very poor ones, lack-
ing a systematic approach to application and insuffi cient in both quality 
and quantity. The development of case law in trademark disputes permits 
a more positive evaluation, while in the area of competition law EC law 
has begun to be applied much more purposefully. ECJ case law is being 
referred to, and arguments by the parties based on EC law are given due 
consideration. Still, these two areas represent the most well-developed 
ones, while similar progress has not yet been seen in other fi elds of EC 
law. Hopefully, satisfactory practice in the fi elds considered here will spill 
over into a more general awareness of EC law and, accordingly, its proper 
application. Since ‘the will’ to apply EC law seems to exist on the part of 
national courts and institutions, ‘the way’ to apply it correctly must also 
be found. For the moment, the way is time, training and practice.
98  Decision of 26 October 2006 (n 96).
